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Abstract: There is something unusual, even paradoxical, about the way that we 
look at the world around us: the utter ease of looking contrasts with the difficulty 
of performing the same act well. If there is light, we just open our eyes and the 
things around us appear. In contrast, we must pay attention to become aware of 
certain aspects of reality and, in particular, to perceive things in a different way. 
Simply seeing, mere visual perception, involves virtually no effort (hence, for 
example, the success of television and screens in general), but looking with care 
is harder: directing our gaze and concentrating on something involves an effort 
and can therefore be tiring. The attentive gaze is more uncommon than we might 
expect. What is it that attention adds to the gaze to transform it in such a 
significant way? Why does the effort of directing our attention imply much more 
than a simple zoom effect? Philosophical gaze and attentive gaze is the same 
thing. 
Keywords: Philosophy, attentive gaze, respect, attention 
 
Resumen: La mirada tiene algo de extraño, de paradójico: la total facilidad de 
mirar contrasta con la dificultad de mirar bien. Si hay luz, con solo abrir los ojos 
se nos aparecen las cosas que nos rodean, pero en cambio hay que prestar 
atención, fijarse bien, para darse cuenta de según qué aspectos de la realidad y, 
sobre todo, para percibir las cosas de otra manera. El solo ver, el mero percibir 
visual casi no cuesta ningún esfuerzo (de ahí, por ejemplo, el éxito de la 
televisión y de las pantallas en general), mientras que el mirar bien, eso sí que 
cuesta: dirigir la mirada y concentrarse en algo supone ya un esfuerzo y acarrea, 
por tanto, un cansancio. La mirada atenta sea más inusual de lo que en un 
principio podría pensarse. ¿Qué es lo que la atención añade a la mirada, hasta el 
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punto de transformarla tan significativamente? ¿Por qué el esfuerzo de la 
atención supone mucho más que un simple aumento de la lente? Mirada 
filosófica y mirada atenta coinciden.   
Palabras clave: Filosofía, mirada atenta, respeto, atención 
 
 
The gaze of the attentive gaze 
     
Our senses open us to the world. In the West, sight has generally 
been regarded as the most powerful of the senses. We now know 
that sight involves light waves reaching our eyes, but historically 
the active and penetrating nature of the sense was often highlighted 
by characterising it as the point of origin for seeing, or as a kind of 
beam. In the 9th century, for example, the great medieval thinker 
John Scottus Eriugena wrote: ‘For who does not know that the eye 
is a corporeal part of the head and that it is moist, and that it is that 
through which the sight pours forth from the brain like rays out of 
the meninx, that is, membrane. The meninx, however, receives the 
nature of light from the heart, that is, from the seat of fire.’1 
And precisely because of the power of sight, western 
philosophy, unlike other cultural traditions, has privileged seeing 
over our other senses. This gives rise to interesting contrasts such 
as that between Greek philosophy and the Jewish tradition, which 
has always placed particular emphasis on hearing and the word. In 
the Jewish tradition, the truth is heard; in the Greek tradition it is 
seen or intuited. Jewish wisdom depends on listening and obeying; 
Greek wisdom, on intuition, seeing and clarity. 
 Our eyes, the organ of sight, have come to symbolise wisdom 
and intelligence. Indeed, they are often described as the ‘windows 
of the soul’. Merleau-Ponty wrote: ‘The eye accomplishes the 
                                                          
1
 SCOTTI ERIUGENAE, Iohannis: Periphyseon (De divisione naturae), Liber 
Primus, SHELDON-WILLIAMS (ed.), The Dublin Institute for Advanced 
Studies, Dublin, 1978. Pag. 125 [481c]. 
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prodigious work of opening the soul to what is not soul – the 
joyous realm of things and their god, the sun.’2   
 Given its power, however, sight can become a means of 
appropriation and control. Certainly, sight is an invitation to action 
and may provoke action: ‘I see’ immediately translates into ‘I can’. 
What I look at I can also, ipso facto, act on. At the very least, part 
of what I see is experienced as ready-to-hand (in Heideggerian 
terminology). Moreover, for something to become useful, to 
become pragmata, it must be within our reach, and it is sight that 
performs the function of bringing things nearer to us. Touch, with 
its capacity for manipulation, is an ally of sight. So it should not 
surprise us that it has been said that seeing is the starting point for 
technology: ‘All techniques are based on visualization and involve 
visualization.’3 Sight is the sense on which our efficacy depends. 
Without it, how could we even thread a needle? Are the plans we 
draft for our construction projects and machines not an emblematic 
example of what we set down on paper to guarantee good results 
based on precise measurements and clear perspectives? Without 
visual images, action is blind and uncertain. 
Having said this, the time appears ripe for a re-examination 
of the primacy of sight in our cultural tradition, and possibly even 
to consider starting or accessing a different tradition. It is doubtful, 
though, whether such changes are possible, or likely rather to end 
up involving little more than declarations of intentions or the 
superficial adoption of other cultural models. In any case, the thesis 
of this paper is that the shift that really is possible is one concerned 
                                                          
2
 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: “Eye and Mind”, in The Primacy of 
Perception: And Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy 
of Art, History and Politics, EDIE, James (trans.), Northwestern University 
Press, Evanston, 1964. Pag. 186. 
3
 ELLUL, Jacques: The Humiliation of the Word,  Eerdmans, Michigan, 1985. 
Pag.  11. 
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primarily with the gaze. Within the confines of a civilisation in 
which sight retains its privileged status, we can nevertheless 
examine another dimension of that sense; one that leads us in the 
direction of wonder rather than control, and towards respect rather 
than the reduction of what we see to mere resources. Sight is, 
without doubt, the sense associated with efficacy, but it is also the 
sense of respect. While up to a point, as Ellul and others have 
observed, the word has been ‘humiliated’ in the civilisation of sight 
and images, things clearly could have turned out differently. There 
is no reason why the word and sight should be at odds when they 
could just as easily be allies. The attentive gaze is very closely 
related both to the word and to listening. A respectful attitude 
always implies a readiness to listen. 
But we must learn how to look. 
 
 
Learning to look in order to see 
 
‘The world is what we see and… nonetheless, we must learn to see 
it.’4 Commentators often move directly from the contrast between 
sight and hearing to that between the image (what is seen) and the 
word (what is heard). The claim is then made that while images 
present everything in ‘pre-processed’ form, the word demands a 
much greater response on our part. With images our role is a 
passive one; the word requires that we provide greater input. This 
contrast, however, is a rather simplistic one, mainly because it is 
almost exclusively screen images that are considered (the so-called 
‘civilisation of the image’ would be better described as the 
‘civilisation of the screen’). The fact is that we can still see things 
that do not appear on screens (though this is increasingly 
                                                          
4
 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: The Visible and the Invisible, LINGIS, 
Alphonso (trans.), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1968. Pag. 4. 
 
PHILOSOPHY AS ATTENTIVE GAZE 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 125-144 
129 
uncommon). Looking at non-screen images does require an effort 
on our part; the world is revealed to us, but not in an automatic 
fashion. Ultimately, what is revealed depends on us, so we must 
learn how to look. Only then will we see all that there is to see. 
‘What exactly does [the painter] ask of [the mountain]? To unveil 
the means, visible and not otherwise, by which it makes itself a 
mountain before our eyes.’5 
Virtually the same point can be made in another way. Were it 
the image that provided meaning, we would need only look. Given 
that this is clearly not the case, we need to focus on how we can 
look with care, which means interpreting properly what is revealed 
to us. 
On an even more basic level, however, we must first learn to 
look and also to see. The first thing is to look: if we do not look, 
neither can we see. Sight is subject to movement. We do not see 
what we do not look at. ‘In order to see clearly’ – according to 
Antoine de Saint-Exupery – ‘you often need to change only your 
line of sight.’  Looking is closely linked to sight, but here we are 
taking a broader view that encompasses the gaze of the soul, or of 
the mind. 
It is possible to look without seeing. As Wittgenstein says in 
his Philosophical Investigations: ‘“He looked at it without seeing 
it.” – There is such a thing. But what is the criterion for it? – Well, 
there is a variety of cases here.’6 One can move one's head, along 
with the rest of one's body, and apparently even direct the gaze but 
still see nothing or virtually nothing of what could be seen. 
 How do we learn to look? We learn to look by looking, just as 
we learn to think by thinking. Exercise is the main teacher. Sight, 
we can therefore say, does not learn from anything but itself. 
                                                          
5
 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: “Eye and Mind”, cit., pag. 166. 
6
 WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig:  Philosophical Investigations, ANSCOMBE, 
Elizabeth (trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1978. Pag. 211. 
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When, for whatever reason, this capacity has not been properly 
applied or is subject to some kind of distortion, learning to look 
means looking in a new way, as if seeing things in broad daylight 
for the first time. Learning to look will also involve pausing to 
examine what is simple and what is part of our everyday 
experience. The most penetrating human gaze is that which is 
capable of detecting the extraordinary character of what is most 
commonplace. ‘God grant the philosopher insight into what lies in 
front of everyone’s eyes,’7 wrote Wittgenstein. If the word 
‘philosophers’ is used here in a restricted sense, then we would do 
well to add ‘and not only philosophers’.  
 
 
Looking and being seen: The gaze of the world 
 
As Bachelard says: ‘Gentleness of seeing while admiring, pride of 
being admired, those are human bonds. But they are active, in both 
directions, in our admiration of the world. The world wishes to see 
itself; the world lives in an active curiosity with ever open eyes. In 
uniting mythological dreams (songes), we can say: The Cosmos is 
an Argus. The Cosmos, a sum of beauties, is an Argus, a sum of 
ever open eyes. Thus the theorem of the reverie of vision is 
translated to the cosmic level: everything that shines sees, and there 
is nothing in the world which shines more than a look.’ 8 That is 
similar to the words of Antonio Machado, the great spanish poet: 
‘The eye you see is not / an eye because you see it; / it is an eye 
because it sees you.’ 
The penetration of sight can reach ‘extremes’ when we 
perceive the world as something that looks at us. 
                                                          
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig, Culture and Value, WINCH, Peter (trans.), Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. Pag. 63. 
8
 BACHELARD, Gaston: The Poetics of Reverie. Childhood, Language, and the 
Cosmos, RUSSELL, Daniel (trans.), Bacon Press, Boston, 1969. Pags. 185-186. 
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 My gaze makes me the centre of the world by placing me at the 
point from which I see everything, and everything is thus relative to 
the point from which I see it. Perhaps we have not given enough 
thought to the obvious fact that the act of looking makes each of us 
the centre of the world. I think this inevitable perceived centrality 
should be counterbalanced. It should not be negated (what price 
would we pay if we negated the subject?), but does need to be 
offset:  first, by the certainty that other subjects also perceive 
themselves as central; and second, by the idea that the world we 
look upon can also, in a manner of speaking, look back at us. This 
may sound odd and disturbing. It does not negate my centrality, but 
qualifies it by pointing to a possibility (not a fact). The disturbing 
nature of this hypothesis is reflected in an anecdote recounted by 
Lacan about an incident that took place when he was a young man: 
‘One day, I was on a small boat, with a few people from a family of 
fishermen in a small port (...) One day, then, as we were waiting for 
the moment to pull in the nets, an individual known as Petit-Jean 
(…) pointed out to me something floating on the surface of the 
waves.  It was a small can, a sardine can.  It floated there in the sun, 
a witness to the canning industry, which we, in fact, were supposed 
to supply.  It glittered in the sun and Petit-Jean said to me: “You 
see that can? Do you see it? Well, it doesn’t see you!” He found 
this incident highly amusing – I less so. I thought about it. Why did 
I find it less amusing than he? It’s an interesting question. To begin 
with, if what petit-Jean said to me, namely, that the can did not see 
me, had any meaning, it was because in a sense, it was looking at 
me all the same. It was looking at me at the level of the point of 
light at which everything that looks at me is situated – and I am not 
speaking metaphorically.’9 The anecdote suggests something very 
similar to the experience described by the painter Paul Klee: ‘In a 
                                                          
9
 LACAN, Jacques: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 
SHERIDAN, Alan (trans.), Penguin Books, London, 1994. Pag. 95. 
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forest I have felt many times that it was not I who looked at the 
forest. Some days I have felt that the trees were looking at me...’ 
 In my view, we do not need to revive any form of animism to 
achieve a richer and more complex view of the world. While it is 
true that I am at the centre when it comes to my own perception, I 
am also aware that there are other ‘centres’ of perception, which I 
call people, and others, such as animals, which have distinct 
perceptual capacities, and plants, which as living organisms are 
sensitive to their surroundings. Moreover, the material we describe 
as ‘inert’ interacts with us. This interaction need not be understood 
within the framework of the Leibnizian theory of universal 
perception; it is enough to be open to the implications of quantum 
theory concerning interaction of elementary particles. 
 In short, my aim in relating these anecdotes (selected from 
among many that could be used to make the same point) is only to 
recommend that we look with greater care and put more effort into 
perception. Paradoxically, when we look with care, we are as likely 
to become aware of our own relative insignificance as of our 
centrality. 
 
 
Paying attention and the spiral of attention 
 
Learning to look essentially means learning to pay attention. People 
often say ‘If you pay attention, you will see that…’ This is the key: 
paying attention is a condition for seeing or becoming aware of 
something, as well as a way to accomplish this. 
What is attention, though? We could characterise it in almost 
the same way as the gaze. Like the gaze, attention is a kind of 
‘spotlight’. ‘It is usual to compare attention with an illuminating 
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light,’ wrote Husserl.10 He also used the expressions ‘mental 
glance’ and ‘glancing ray’, referring to the directing of the ego 
towards something and the way it is deflected back. Our attention 
can shift, for instance, from something in the external world to 
something in our own consciousness, and can also move in the 
opposite direction. Attention, then, is also a movement. The shifts it 
involves occur within the field of consciousness: ‘Ultimately it 
extends [the range of the unitary notion of attention] as far as the 
concept: consciousness of something.’11 This is not, however, 
simply a matter of two things coinciding in the same field. Paying 
attention and being conscious are closely linked.  A minimum level 
of attention is needed to be conscious of something, and attention 
depends on consciousness: they are two sides of the same coin. 
Merleau-Ponty describes this relationship as follows: ‘For it to gain 
possession of the knowledge brought by attention, it is enough for 
it to come to itself again, in the sense in which a man is said to 
come to himself again after fainting. On the other hand, inattentive 
or delirious perception is a semi-torpor, describable only in terms 
of negations, its object has no consistency, the only objects about 
which one can speak being those of waking consciousness.’12  
 Attention is a kind of activity (‘paying attention’ implies 
focusing and selecting), but also a state (‘being focused, alert, 
etc.’). As a state it contrasts with being unfocused, sleepy or 
distracted. William James, one of the founders of modern 
psychology, gave a clear description of what attention involves: 
‘Focalisation, concentration, of consciousness are of its essence. It 
                                                          
10
 HUSSERL, Edmund: Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, 
W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, W.R.,  (trans.), George Allen/Humanities Press, 
London/New York. 1969, § 92, pag. 269. 
11
 HUSSER, Edmund: Logical Investigations, vol. I, FINDLAY, J. N. (trans), 
Humanity Books, New York, 2000. Pag. 384. 
12
 MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice: Phenomenology of Perception, SMITH, Colin 
(trans.), Routledge, London/New York, 1962. Pag. 27. 
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implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively 
with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the 
confused, dazed, scatter-brained state which in French is called 
distraction, and Zerstreutheit in German.’13 
Attention means leaving behind a state characterised by a 
certain lack of focus, sleepiness or immersion in the flow of things. 
In relation to the idea of sleepiness, attention is an awakening; seen 
as a movement away from lack of focus, distraction and flow, 
attention is an activity that arises from the self, an effort that 
consists in taking oneself out of the stream of the impersonal in 
order to come to a stop. Extracting ourselves from this flow to 
come to a stop is harder than we might think, though. We are in the 
habit of letting ourselves drift, and grow accustomed to not making 
an effort and to the ease this brings.  
Of course, to come to a stop does not mean to hesitate. It is the 
condition that makes attention possible. We can perceive things, or 
at least perceive them precisely, only when we come to a stop. To 
become aware of the progress of the sun, or the rhythm of our own 
breathing, we must come to a halt. Oddly, this stillness makes us 
visionaries. It is not those who are in the greatest hurry or who are 
most mobile that see most, it is those who are capable of coming to 
a stop. In our increasingly fast-paced society this is something we 
can experience very intensely on the rare occasions when we 
manage to make ourselves pause. Given that we spend most of our 
time immersed in the impersonal in a thousand different ways, 
when we extract ourselves from this flow we are at first 
disconcerted (indeed, we often find it hard to tolerate solitude and 
silence), but then we begin to see. 
 Needless to say, we need not take pause in any special place. 
For this purpose, all places are privileged: the profound is to be 
                                                          
13
 JAMES, William: The Principles of Psychology, The University of 
Chicago/Encyclopaedia Britannica, Chicago/London, 1952. Pag. 261. 
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found in the everyday. Neither do we need to travel to remote and 
exotic locations. Anyone unable to see what is surprising and 
beautiful in their immediate surroundings will not find these 
qualities in far-off lands either. Familiarity all too often immerses 
us in routine, and to a large degree the everyday is the river of 
inattention that sweeps us along. In his analysis of the mode of 
being of what is ‘ready-to-hand’ in Being and Time, Heidegger 
writes: ‘The readiness-to-hand which belongs to any such region 
beforehand has the character of inconspicuous familiarity, and it 
has it in an even more primordial sense than does the Being of the 
ready-to-hand.’14 What I am most interested in underlining in this 
text is the fact that these ‘regions’ that surround and are familiar to 
us do not attract our attention. The same applies to ‘things’, which 
means that familiarity (habit, routine, etc.) results in a certain 
degree of inattention and leads us to become dispersed among 
things. This probably happens because this approach is not too 
tiring and we need not expend much energy. We like to let 
ourselves go with the flow. All of this highlights the dangers 
inherent in the everyday. The most serious of these concern what 
we no longer perceive due to the state of inattention we are drawn 
into. Even when we are immersed in the everyday, though, this 
situation can be turned around. We can stop, and when we do the 
simple and commonplace character of the familiar can be revealed 
to us in all its strangeness and profundity. 
 In addition to the possibilities of awakening and taking pause, 
we also need to examine the idea of receiving, or, more accurately, 
of emptying ourselves in order to receive. Although this idea 
contrasts with the image of attention as a spotlight, there is no 
contradiction in saying that attention involves a kind of heightening 
and broadening of our capacity to perceive. In order to receive one 
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 HEIDEGGER, Martin: Being and Time, MACQUARRIE, John & 
ROBINSON, Edward (trans.), Harper & Row, New York, 1962. Pags. 137-138. 
JOSEP MARÍA ESQUIROL 
 
HASER. Revista Internacional de Filosofía Aplicada, nº 8, 2017, pp. 125-144 
136 
 
must have free space available and a very flexible ‘opening’. 
Otherwise, how is the other to enter? Contrary to what is often 
thought attention does not imply rigidity. Rigidity of any kind 
hinders perception. This misunderstanding is nevertheless 
widespread, particularly in the field of education. According to 
Simone Weil: ‘To pay attention, it is necessary to know how to set 
about it. Most often attention is confused with a kind of muscular 
effort. If one says to one's pupils: "Now you must pay attention," 
one sees them contracting their brows, holding their breath, 
stiffening their muscles. If after two minutes they are asked what 
they have been paying attention to, they cannot reply. They have 
been concentrating on nothing. They have not been paying 
attention. They have been contracting their muscles.’15 The effort 
of attention does not require that any muscle be contracted. 
Attention is a tension (paying attention is like drawing a bow), but 
this tension does not involve muscular rigidity (Rodin’s famous 
sculpture, The Thinker, is therefore not very lifelike: all of the 
effort made by the figure is being applied to tense his muscles). It is 
a different kind of tension that must come into play when we pay 
attention, and it must be a flexible tension like that of the archer’s 
bow. 
 Together with flexibility and tension, an emptying is also 
necessary. An emptying and a detachment from the self must be 
achieved. Our thoughts must be suspended so that our minds are 
more available and penetrable. We must put aside our own 
‘baggage’ (at least momentarily) so that we can move away from 
our own centre. Attention requires that we do not allow ourselves 
to be diluted in the impersonal; that we do not cling to what is ours; 
and that we do not fill ourselves with easy certainties. We must 
avoid becoming dispersed in everything, but let go of ourselves a 
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 WEIL, Simone: Waiting on God, CRAUFURD, Emma (trans.), Routledge and 
Keagan, London, 1951. Pag. 54. 
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bit so that we can be more authentically ourselves. The act of 
paying attention is somewhat paradoxical: the effort the subject 
must make does not involve being more present, but rather a 
reduction or emptying, and an opening towards the other. The 
subjective intensity of attention involves making a space available 
to receive something or allow entry to the object that is the focus of 
attention. Not paying attention means remaining closed or too 
impenetrable to the influence of the other. Particularly helpful in 
illustrating this point are C. S. Lewis’ reflections on how to look at 
paintings (that is, how to direct our attention at them), which are 
found in an essay on the experience of reading. Lewis says that 
when we look at a painting most of us tend to make ‘use’ of it in 
some way. In other words, we do something with the painting 
instead of opening ourselves to it so that it can do something in us. 
In particular, we make use of paintings when we do not give them 
the attention they deserve: ‘We must not let loose our own 
subjectivity upon the pictures and make them its vehicles. We must 
begin by laying aside as completely as we can all our own 
preconceptions, interests, and associations. We must make room 
for Botticelli's Mars and Venus, or Cimabue's Crucifixion, by 
emptying out our own. After the negative effort, the positive. We 
must use our eyes. We must look, and go on looking till we have 
certainly seen exactly what is there. We sit down before the picture 
in order to have something done to us, not that we may do things 
with it. The first demand any work of any art makes upon us is 
surrender. Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself out of the way.’16  
The passage describes very well what it means to pay attention: 
‘look, and go on looking till we have certainly seen exactly what is 
there’ and at the same time receive. Lewis says the same about both 
painting and literature. All the examples he gives underscore the 
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 LEWIS, Clive: An Experiment in Criticism,  Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1961. Pag. 16 . 
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fact that only true attention can take us outside ourselves, and in so 
doing allow us to learn. In this light, attention is seen as a struggle 
against self-absorption. There is no other struggle as worthwhile as 
this one can end up being. This perspective also allows us to 
understand that insufficient attention implies insufficient respect. 
When we focus on ourselves – on our own ideas, interests, opinions 
and desires – we become incapable of receiving the other, and 
therefore incapable of respecting it. 
 The need for flexibility must be stressed. There is a kind of 
attention that in the end does not deserve to be described as such, 
and, in fact, hinders perception. It is important to realise that there 
are no models or standards for defining attention. The image of the 
spotlight is probably a good one, but so are the ideas of flexibility 
and receiving. The fact that a spotlight is directed at something 
specific suggests concentration. In contrast, the notion of receiving 
involves opening up to the other. Could it be that a certain kind of 
concentration is inflexible and allows only limited opening to the 
other? In my view, we should not give up either image: together 
they show us how rich an activity paying attention is. Sometimes 
we need to focus in order to pay attention; on other occasions we 
need to open ourselves up. Sometimes I experience a form of 
attention with virtually no object. Nevertheless, this state keeps me 
open and alert to what is around me and to its demands. Other 
times, attention is more focused, and involves looking at and 
examining something specific. At times, despite a great deal of 
opening, we perceive nothing; on other occasions, too much focus 
yields the same result. It may even be the case that optimal 
attention involves striking a balance between these two approaches, 
and that too great an emphasis on either diminishes our capacity to 
see. 
 In any case, flexibility is always essential. Even when focusing 
our attention, we must take an unhurried approach, freeing 
ourselves of any pressures and especially of any preconceived 
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notions. Throwing ourselves into the task of paying attention will 
be utterly counterproductive. The best form of attention arises from 
a state of relative calm. Attention is not a kind of spiritual 
determination with which we nail objects down: its application 
should be a mild and serene process. I do not see attention as a 
form of strict and continuous abstraction. Indeed, I would count 
those who are self-absorbed among the distracted as surely as those 
who are scatterbrained. Neither has achieved the right kind of 
attention. Attention should be firm but mild. We should work to 
acquire the flexibility needed to shift our attention from one object 
to another as required by the course of events. The secret is to 
achieve a form of attention that is steady without being unyielding, 
and flexible without being slack. 
 Given this understanding of attention, my meaning will now be 
clear when I speak of how it can benefit us in terms of our growth 
as individuals. True knowledge comes from looking attentively and 
systematically in the right direction. Patience in paying attention 
leads to significant insights and discoveries. 
 As I have already mentioned, attention is learned through 
exercise: paying attention is habit-forming. It is a skill at which we 
become proficient by virtue of constant exercise. The effort we 
make today may bear fruit tomorrow in a way that is completely 
unforeseeable. Weil also has something to say on this point: ‘If we 
concentrate our attention on trying to solve a problem of geometry, 
and if at the end of an hour we are no nearer to doing so than at the 
beginning, we have nevertheless been making progress each minute 
of that hour in another more mysterious dimension. Without our 
knowing or feeling it, this apparently barren effort has brought 
more light into the soul. The result will one day be discovered in 
prayer. Moreover it may very likely be felt besides in some 
department of the intelligence in no way connected with 
mathematics. Perhaps he who made the unsuccessful effort will one 
day be able to grasp the beauty of a line of Racine more vividly on 
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account of it.’17 Not surprisingly, Weil believes that the 
fundamental goal of education should be precisely to ‘exercise 
attention’. 
The acuity attention can be applied in countless different ways. 
It allows us to perceive specific aspects of physical reality, and can 
also be applied in the moral sphere. It can detect what relates to 
beauty, or to technical efficiency, and also what is concerned with 
goodness or justice. The value of things and actions is revealed to 
the attentive gaze, and what is just or good takes on a natural 
primacy from such a perspective. Painting aspires to be recognised 
as beautiful; just action aspires to be preferred over a lie… 
Attention is fundamental to our sense of morality, but this does 
mean that we should not also recognise the value of moral 
reasoning. I do believe, however, that there is something crucial to 
our sense of morality that does not emerge from the lengthy and 
arduous application of reason. This view is one I think many share, 
among them Rousseau. Leaving aside the question of whether or 
not Rousseau contradicted himself on this point, I will refer only 
briefly to what he says in his Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundations of Inequality Among Men,
18
 where he speaks of 
compassion, which he understands as repugnance at seeing a 
fellow-creature suffer. Rousseau argues that compassion is a 
natural feeling that even beasts show signs of. He stresses that this 
feeling precedes the exercise of reason, and therefore is not a 
product of it. For Rousseau, the conclusion that I should feel 
repugnance in the face of the suffering of other creatures is not one 
arrived at after lengthy digressions: it is a feeling I experience 
naturally and spontaneously. Nevertheless, might this feeling not 
depend on a minimum level of attention? Rousseau gets to the heart 
                                                          
17
 WEIL, Simone: op. cit., pag. 52. 
18
 ROUSSEAU, Jean-Jacques: ‘The Discourses’ and Other Early Political 
Writings, GOUVERICH, V. (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997. 
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of the matter when he criticises the philosopher, shut away in his 
room, who ‘only has to put his hands over his ears and to argue 
with himself a little’ to ignore the fact that a murder is being 
committed with impunity beneath his window.  This so-called 
philosopher pays no attention to what is going on around him. 
Instead, he uses the exercise of reason to isolate and distract 
himself. Rousseau continues in an ironic tone: ‘Savage man has not 
this admirable talent’.19 Clearly he is referring not to the capacity to 
pay attention, but to the ability to turn off one’s attention so as to 
better evade what it might reveal. Uncivilised man is doubtless 
unacquainted with any ethical theory, but he does have the capacity 
to pay attention, to look with care, and this is precisely what is 
most important. Civilised man, on the other hand, can study and 
learn about wonderful philosophical systems and sophisticated 
moral theories, but his ability to pay attention may be atrophied or 
intentionally put aside, leaving him incapable of contact with the 
world around him. 
 The pseudo-philosopher covers his ears, avoids looking out the 
window and goes off on tangents, and in so doing ceases to pay 
attention to his situation. I am particularly interested in Rousseau's 
observation that philosophy (false philosophy) isolates us from 
things and from others. This kind of philosophy turns off our 
natural compassion, cutting us off from the world. Attention, on the 
other hand, connects us to the world, to its density and novelty (as 
Arendt would say). The atrophy of our sense of morality follows 
naturally from the atrophy of our capacity to be in the world and 
recognise its continuous novelty. 
 In my view, Arendt is absolutely right when she says that one 
of the most important characteristics of totalitarianism is its practical 
identification of control, security, absence of novelty and rejection of 
the world. There are certain parallels between the distractions of the 
                                                          
19
 ROUSSEAU: op. cit., pag. 153. 
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pseudo-philosopher and the experience of mass man in totalitarian 
regimes. In such regimes, the individual's knowledge and vision of 
the world tend to be governed exclusively by the coherence of an 
‘ideology’, rather than by experience or contact with the reality of 
the world. The masses leave reality and the world behind because 
novelty is a natural part of that world; the coherence of the prevailing 
theory is more comforting and safer than continually dealing with 
the novelty of the world and the demands it makes. The resulting 
isolation means life without the world and without identity: ‘Self 
and world, capacity for thought and experience are lost at the same 
time.’20 There are many ways to isolate oneself, some more 
sophisticated than others. There are theories that insulate us from 
the world and its demands under the pretext of sheltering and 
protecting us (though these may more accurately be described as 
‘ideologies’ in the worst sense of the word).21 
 In Husserlian terms, ideology evacuates the meaning inherent in 
the world of life and absolutises logical relation. The latter, cut adrift 
from reality, can be adopted by individuals without their capacity for 
reflection or experience of the world ever coming into play. 
Individuals can apply the logical system without thought and without 
reference to the world. 
 Attention connects us to the world, and this link is our best 
vaccine against dogmatism, slogans, ideologies and languages that 
                                                          
20 ARENDT, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace, New York, 
1973. Pag. 477. 
21 Ideology, understood literally as the logic of an idea, is, according to Arendt, 
the backdrop to totalitarianism. And what Arendt says about political 
totalitarianism parallels an observation made by Levinas about the philosophical 
tradition of the West: “Philosophy itself is identified with the substitution of 
ideas for persons, the theme for the interlocutor, the interiority of the logical 
relation for the exteriority of interpellation.” LEVINAS, Emmanuel: Totality and 
Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, LINGIS, Alphonso (trans.), Duquesne 
University Press & Martinus Nijhoff, Pittsburgh & The Hague, 1969. Pag. 88. 
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seem technical but are in fact empty. This connection also 
safeguards us against the atrophy of our moral feeling.  Without it 
and without our experience of things and others, everything tends 
to become contrived. Words lack meaningful content; what we say 
does not respond to anything or anyone (for we are no longer 
capable of listening or of feeling that we are engaged in a dialogue, 
and no longer grasp the requirements of each situation). In the 
absence of this connection, theories focus on evasion, mere play or 
security, rather than pursuing a sense of direction and meaning. 
In making these points I have two aims in mind: first, to 
indicate the parallel between the role I am assigning to attention 
and that which other authors such as Rousseau and Scheler have 
attributed to moral feeling; and second, to highlight the close 
relationship between attention, contact with the world, and 
reflection, which is also highly significant in the moral sphere.  
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